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AMERICA'S FIRST "HATE SPEECH" 
REGULATION 
Michael W. McConnell* 
Americans have the endearing but frustrating tendency to view 
every development in public life as if it were happening for the first 
time. Each issue is a new thing under the sun. Now the issue of 
"hate speech"-speech that is designed to degrade or injure other 
people on the basis of their race, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orienta-
tion or other sensitive characteristic-is the hot new free speech 
question. The law reviews are filled with learned analyses. Task 
forces have been appointed. Colleges and universities are debating 
the question. Legislation has been introduced in Congress. 
Yet to my knowledge, none of the scholarly analyses of the 
issue has attempted to draw on the American historical experience 
with this problem. "Hate speech" is one of the oldest public issues 
in America; the first law was enacted almost 350 years ago. The 
question traditionally has been framed in these terms: to what ex-
tent does a liberal society require social conditions of mutual re-
spect and toleration, and to what extent may the force of law be 
employed to attain or preserve those conditions? Attention to his-
torical experience may help us to appreciate both the roots of hate 
speech regulation and some of its pitfalls. 
The first hate speech regulation in America was Maryland's 
Toleration Act of 1649.1 Maryland had been founded a few years 
earlier by a Roman Catholic nobleman and friend of Charles I, 
Lord Baltimore. Lord Baltimore intended to make Maryland a ha-
ven for his fellow Catholics (who at that time were severely perse-
cuted in the mother country) and to extend protection to other 
dissenters from the Church of England as well. The Toleration Act, 
which precedes by forty years the famous act of Parliament by that 
name, was enacted by the colonial legislature, superseding a similar 
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proclamation by Lord Baltimore. As part of legislation establishing 
the "free exercise" of religion (the first appearance of those words in 
the laws ofthis continent), the Act imposed a fine often shillings on 
any person who called another "by such opprobrious terms as, Her-
etic, Schismatic, Idolator, Puritan, Independent, Presbyterian, Po-
pish priest, Jesuit, Papist, Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist, 
Brownist, Antinomian, Barrowist, Roundhead, and Separatist. "2 
In the only recorded prosecution under the statute or the predeces-
sor proclamation, a Catholic named William Lewis was fined for 
"interfering by opprobrious reproaches with two Protestants"3-an 
encouraging sign, since most colonial officials at the time were 
Catholics. 
It may be objected that this statute deals with a subject-reli-
gion-far removed from today's concerns of race, sex, sexual orien-
tation, and the like. But we must not commit the anachronism of 
dismissing religion as a private matter of little weight or conse-
quence. Religion was central to the Maryland colonists' identity, 
and differences in religion were never far from their minds. Reli-
gious discord delivered Lord Baltimore's friend, Charles I, to the 
scaffold, and England to civil war. Moreover, the immediate prob-
lem addressed by the Maryland Toleration Act was not unlike that 
of today's hate speech regulations on campus. Words were used, 
then as now, to inflict injury, to humiliate, to ostracize, and to 
subordinate. Historian Sanford Cobb said of religious disputants in 
seventeenth century Massachusetts that they "made of their 
tongues weapons harder to bear than clubs."4 The Maryland Toler-
ation Act is thus an exceedingly close analogy to the regulation of 
hate speech on modern American campuses. 
Unfortunately, we do not have much information about the 
implementation or effects of the Toleration Act. Following the 
downfall of the King, a Protestant faction seized power in the col-
ony in 1652 and repealed the Toleration Act two years later, replac-
ing it with a law explicitly denying protection to persons who 
"profess the exercise of the Popish Religion."s Oliver Cromwell 
forced the colonists to repeal the 1652 Act, thus reinstating the Tol-
eration Act, but in the spirit of the day one would not expect faith-
ful enforcement. Notwithstanding this lack of enforcement, 
however, three aspects of the Maryland experience seem significant 
today. 
2. Cobb, Religious Liberty, at 376 (cited in note 1). 
3. I d. at 3 72. 
4. Id. at 215. 
5. Maryland Acts of Assembly, I, 340, quoted in Cobb, Religious Liberty at 379 (cited 
in note 1). 
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First, the framers of the Maryland statute obviously thought 
that outlawing hate speech ("opprobrious terms") was consistent 
with-not in opposition to-a regime of free speech and religion. 
Restrictions of this sort would advance free discourse and inquiry, 
because they would enable persons of all groups, including the most 
socially despised, to participate on equal terms. The Toleration Act 
did not view religious freedom as meaning only an absence of gov-
ernmental coercion; it sought to regulate the private sphere to en-
sure social conditions of toleration. 
The idea that governmental intervention in the realm of speech 
might promote the liberal society is utterly foreign to modem con-
ceptions of freedom of speech, which are under challenge today 
mostly from a segment of the post-modem left. Conservatives and 
ACLU liberals alike share the conviction that the first amendment 
is a restraint on the power of government and that the social condi-
tions of tolerance, like the social conditions of patriotism, virtue, or 
other ideals, must take care of themselves without the help of law. 
The great free speech controversies of the twentieth century have 
typically involved speakers-Jehovah's Witnesses, Nazis, or Com-
munists-who were themselves intolerant of others. 
The post-modem left challenge to the prevailing conception of 
freedom of speech, of which hate speech regulation is the most con-
spicuous element, may seem newfangled and paradoxical. How can 
the principle of freedom of speech empower the authorities to re-
strict the speech of private persons, however hateful that speech 
may be? Surely such restrictions must be defended on the basis of 
some goal (perhaps racial equality) other than promoting free dis-
course and inquiry, and must be subjected to a healthy dose of lib-
eral skepticism. 
It is helpful to realize that the post-modem left challenge to 
free speech doctrine is not a new position. The hate speech regula-
tors stand in the honorable shoes of Lord Baltimore and the Mary-
land colonists, who believed that private intolerance, through the 
use of hurtful epithets, is a significant obstacle to achievement of a 
society in which persons of all faiths (today we would say all races, 
sexes, sexual orientations, and the like) can live together peaceably 
and equally. In a world in which Catholics, for example, are both 
seriously outnumbered and socially subordinated, a jurisdiction that 
wants to offer Catholics a hospitable place in which to live must be 
concerned with the danger that private intolerance will make that 
objective unattainable. By the same token, if the desired end is a 
community of inquiry in which all viewpoints and perspectives can 
be shared, is it unreasonable for university administrators to think 
20 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:17 
that an interventionist policy is necessary to ensure that some por-
tions of the student body are not silenced and excluded from the 
discourse? 
Second, the framers of the Toleration Act of 1649 had a diffi-
cult drafting problem. They were caught between the dangers of 
vagueness on the one hand and underinclusiveness on the other. 
How could they define "hate speech" so that they could outlaw it? 
The problem was particularly difficult because part of the religious 
exercise they were protecting was the ability to proclaim the faith, 
which often entails an explanation ("exhortation" might be a better 
word) of why other religions are false. How could the colonial au-
thorities tell when legitimate discourse ends and "opprobrious 
terms" begin? 
The Maryland drafters did not do a very good job. If their list 
is taken to be exclusive, there are a number of opprobrious epithets 
they left out: Socinian, ranter, pagan, Christ-killer, fanatic, hire-
ling, and many more. If the list is taken only to be illustrative, it 
doesn't solve the vagueness problem. If a Protestant maliciously 
mocks the Latin of the mass by calling it "hocus-pocus,"6 is that 
covered? If a Unitarian sneers at the credulity of those who believe 
in a virgin birth, is that covered? Conversely, some of the terms in 
the Maryland Act seem rather innocent. "Presbyterian," for exam-
ple, is not an obvious example of an opprobrious epithet. And any 
of the terms, in a certain context, might be perfectly legitimate. 
That is the problem with legislation by list. If, however, the Mary-
land legislators had used another approach instead of listing forbid-
den epithets, they would have had a different set of problems. They 
might have based the law on the actual intent of the speaker to 
ostracize or subordinate members of a different faith, which makes 
it virtually unenforceable. Only the speaker knows his own intent. 
Or they might have based it on the effect on the hearer, which 
makes it vaguer than ever, and makes speech vulnerable to the reac-
tions of the most sensitive among us. 
Modem campus administrators face much the same problem. 
Like the Maryland legislators, they, too, could publish a list of for-
bidden epithets, the modem equivalents of "heretic," "schismatic," 
"papist," or "roundhead." We can all imagine the contents of the 
list. But no university has opted for that approach, perhaps for rea-
sons of good manners. Instead they opt for vagueness. The Univer-
sity of Michigan interim code-the one instituted after the first 
effort was held unconstitutional by a federal court-forbids "verbal 
6. The expression "hocus-pocus" is a corruption of the Latin hoc est corpus, "this is 
my body," the eucharistic formula. 
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slurs, invectives or epithets referring to an individual's race, ethnic-
ity, religion, sex, sexual orientation," etc., made with the "purpose 
of injuring the person to whom the words or actions are directed," 
but excluding statements made as a part of a "discussion or ex-
change of an idea, ideology, or philosophy."7 Try to figure out 
when that will apply. 
Given the difficulties of drafting intelligible standards, it should 
come as no surprise that the enforcement of hate speech codes has 
been clumsy and unpredictable. Under the original Michigan code, 
for example, a graduate student was haled before a disciplinary 
board to account for his statement in a social work class that he 
believed homosexuality to be a disease and that he intended to de-
velop a counseling program to help patients to overcome it.s An-
other student was "counseled" and required to apologize for 
commenting in class that "he had heard that minorities had a diffi-
cult time in the course and that he had heard that they were not 
treated fairly."9 At the same time, some of the more egregious inci-
dents of racism on campus would apparently fall outside most hate 
speech codes because they are directed at a general audience rather 
than at a particular person whom they seek to injure. 
Third, the selectivity reflected in the Maryland statute is not 
random. Several epithets referring to Catholics are listed, because 
they were precisely the protected class whom the colonial authori-
ties had in mind. There are no epithets pertaining to Jews. There 
are no epithets pertaining to atheists. There are no epithets pertain-
ing to pagans, Muslims, or other assorted heathen-even though 
the vast majority of the inhabitants of Maryland in 1649 adhered to 
religions the legislators would have considered heathen. By inter-
esting contrast, the 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of the Colony 
of Carolina, drafted in part by John Locke, which was in other re-
spects less liberal in its protection of religious freedom, explicitly 
extended its protection to "Jews, heathens, and other dissenters 
from the purity of Christian religion."Io 
It was no accident that the Maryland legislature outlawed 
some epithets and not others. Maryland was designed as a haven 
7. University of Michigan Interim Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Con-
duct By Students in the University Environment, at 5. 
8. The incident is recounted in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 
(E.D. Mich. 1989). 
9. 721 F. Supp. at 866. 
I 0. Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina § I 07 ( 1669), reprinted in Mattie Erma Ed-
wards Parker, ed., North Carolina Charters and Constitutions, 1578-1698 I32, I49 (Carolina 
Charter Tercentenary Comm'n, I963). 
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for religious dissenters, but religious dissenters of a particular kind. 
Others were not welcome. 
We see that same phenomenon in modem hate speech rules, 
which forbid hate speech directed against certain groups but not 
against others. You can, for example, call a fellow student a "racist, 
fascist homophobe," or a "pimply nerd," or a "damn Yankee," with 
impunity on any campus in America. Epithets like these serve no 
less to cut off debate, to humiliate, to ostracize, and to exclude; but 
they are not covered. Modem hate speech rules are intended to 
protect groups, but only groups of a certain kind. The opinions of 
significant subgroups of Americans on issues such as race and sexu-
ality are not welcome on most American campuses. And these 
voices are not often heard. Who wants to be hissed in class? 
There is a distinction, one might respond: the Maryland stat-
ute leaves out groups that are disfavored by the hegemonic authori-
ties, while the hate speech regulations protect the oppressed and 
vulnerable in society. With all respect, this reflects a distorted pic-
ture of power relations in modem American academia. Most mod-
em colleges and universities are passionately-<me might even say 
religiously--(;()mmitted to a particular view of race, gender, and 
sexual orientation. It is not merely a coincidence that the speech 
protected by the hate speech regulations is speech that is broadly 
consistent with the reigning orthodoxy, while the speech that is pro-
hibited is contrary to it. Of course, some universities are excep-
tions; but the exceptional institutions typically have not enacted 
speech codes. 
The University of Michigan rules could just as easily have pro-
hibited "verbal slurs, invective or epithets directed at an individ-
ual," with the same requirements of intention to injure and the 
same exception for words used in course of the discussion or ex-
change of ideas-without confining the forbidden epithets to those 
based on race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, or the like. Nothing 
would be lost by dropping the limitations. But I am aware of no 
college or university that has adopted a hate speech regulation with-
out the list of protected classes. That they do not do so is an indica-
tion that their framers are less concerned with hate speech in 
general than with protecting their own ideological position-just as 
the particular range of religious faiths protected by the Maryland 
legislators was an indication of their ideological position. 
College administrators sometimes defend selective protection 
on the ground that racial, sexual, and other invective of the prohib-
ited sort is more wounding than other types of opprobrious lan-
guage. But how can we know? As an empirical matter I suspect 
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that various fonns of personal insult ("pimply nerd") are, if any-
thing, more humiliating-more humiliating precisely because there 
will be no group to rally round in protest and indignation. Indeed, 
the very fact that racist, sexist, and homophobic speech is so widely 
condemned on campus suggests that its victims are not without so-
cial support. But even if college administrators could demonstrate 
that the prohibited fonns of invective are more harmful, this would 
not mean that other insults, which are also hurtful, should be ex-
cluded from protection. Why not prohibit all insults that have the 
purpose and effect of silencing, subordinating, or excluding a fellow 
member of the university community, without drawing dubious dis-
tinctions on the basis of content? 
It is one thing for the authorities to promote civility in dis-
course. It is quite another thing to promote civility only selec-
tively-to apply a double standard depending on whether the 
incivility accords with or opposes the ideological position of the au-
thorities. In this context, the content distinctions are suspiciously 
congruent with the ideological position of the university. Hate 
speech regulation can be seen as an effort to disarm one particularly 
unappealing segment of the university's opponents without disarm-
ing any of its ideological allies. 
An examination of the Maryland Toleration Act of 1649 thus 
suggests that we should not accept too quickly the common position 
of conservatives and ACLU liberals that hate speech regulation is, 
in principle, contrary to the requirements of a free society. Our 
early history shows that lawmakers no less committed to a free soci-
ety than most of us came to the conclusion that a free, equal, and 
tolerant society must protect its principles from the forces of intol-
erance, even when they manifest themselves in speech. But even if 
we become more sympathetic, in principle, to the concept of hate 
speech regulation, we should also be aware that there are grave, and 
perhaps insuperable, difficulties in drafting regulations that are 
broad enough without being vague. We must be ever conscious of 
the possibility that, in the guise of regulations for the preservation 
of toleration, the authorities will use their power over speech to ad-
vance their own ideological causes at the expense of dissenters. 
